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SEPTEMBE -OCToBER 1959
"THE OPINION OF THE COURT"
By JUDGE MORTIMER STONE
Mortimer Stone received his A.B.
degree from Colgate University in
1904 and his LL.B. degree in 1910
from New York Law School. In
1953 he was awarded the D.C.L.
degree honoris causa by Colgate
University. From 1945 to 1953
Judge Stone sat as Associate Jus-
tice, and from 1953 to 1957 as
Chief Justice, of the Colorado Su-
preme Court. He is with the Denver
firm of Yegge, Bates, Hall and
Shulenberg, of counsel. A past pres-
ident of the Colorado Bar Associa-
tion, Judge Stone is now a member
of the American, Colorado, and
Denver Bar Associations.
For many years in the official publication of the decisions and
opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court, it has been the set formula
to have the initial opinion prefaced by the statement: "Mr. Justice
Doe delivered the opinion of the court." The opinion following that
preface, in most cases, has been concurred in by the requisite num-
ber of judges so as to become in fact the opinion as well as the
judgment of the court; but such is not always the case. When the
preface is not true the hurried attorney and sometimes the court
itself is likely to be deceived.
The UnIted States Supreme Court carefully distinguished be-
tween the fipquently-used terms "opinion" and "decision" in Rogers
v. Hill.1 The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Butler, said:
"Here the mandate was to proceed not in accordance
with the 'opinion' but with the 'decision'. These words,
while often loosely used interchangeably, are not equiva-
lents. The court's decision of a case is its judgment thereon.
Its opinion is a statement of the reasons on which the judg-
ment rests."
As said by the Missouri Supreme Court: "[U] ntil the opinion is
adopted by the court it is not its product. When it is so adopted it
becomes the decision of the court."
2
In other words, there may be a decision of the court as to the
judgment to be rendered without decision as to the reasons therefor.
A classic example of that situation is the case of Yunker v.
Nichols,3 where the three judges agreed that the judgment of the
trial court should be reversed but each in a separate opinion based
1 289 U.S. 582, 587 (1933).
2 Edwards v. Bell, 343 Mo. 824, 123 S.W.2d 83, 85 (1938).
3 1 Colo. 551 (1872).
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his conclusion on a different ground.
Where a majority of the court concurs merely in the result, the
principles expressed in an opinion cannot be considered as control-
ling under the rule of stare decisis. Where two or more judges de-
liver opinions which arrive at the same result, but for different
reasons, and other judges concur generally, the case cannot be con-
sidered as authority on any of the reasons urged.4 For example, the
court in Scott v. Times-Mirror Co.5 said:
[O]nly four Justices participated in the decision, and
only three of these concurred on this point .... Since the
concurrence of four members of the court is necessary to
a decision in bank. . , it is plain that the language quoted
... is not a decision of this court upon the point there con-
sidered."
Conversely, as our Colorado Court has held, where a majority
of the court approves a rule stated in a concurring opinion, it be-
comes the opinion of the court.6 Where the court divides equally,
and judgment is affirmed by operation of law, it constitutes no
precedent. 7 In a state which has asserted the controlling authority
of stare decisis,8 the status of an opinion becomes a matter of im-
portance; and it is still a point to be argued even if we have some-
times changed to the "Rule of the Chancellor's Foot."
In the Colorado Reports up to Volume 12, there is no statement
as to the opinion of the court, and only the name of the judge who
wrote the opinion is used. In these early volumes, however, care
was taken to state when the opinion was not that of the court. In
reporting the case of Western Union Tel. Co. v. Eyser,10 the opinion
by Mr. Justice Belford was followed by a statement by Mr. Justice
Wells of the questions on which the opinion of Mr. Justice Belford
was not concurred in by the other judges, and it was also said that:
"Upon the other questions the opinion of Mr. Justice Belford is the
opinion of the whole court."'"
Even after the use of the "Opinion of the Court" prefix was
begun in Volume 12 of the Colorado Reports, it was not uniformly
followed for a time, and the court was still careful in their use of
the word "opinion." In reporting Raynolds v. Ray,12 it was stated
before the first opinion that: "Mr. Justice Elliott delivered the
opinion of the court concerning the validity of the attachment
liens." Then, following his opinion, it was said: "Chief Justice Beck
(dissenting upon the validity of the attachment liens) delivered
the opinion of the court on other points." Such meticulous care, how-
ever, has long been disregarded.
4 See 21 C.J.S. 305-06 (1940) and cases cited therein.
5 181 Cal. 345, 184 Pac. 672, 679 (1919).
6 London Guaranty Co. v. McCoy, 97 Colo. 13, 45 P.2d 900 (1935).
7 People ey t, Walker v. Stapleton, 79 Colo. 629, 247 Pac. 1062 (1926).
8 Newton v. Mann, 111 Colo. 76, 137 P.2d 776 (1943); Murray v. Newmeyer, 66 Colo. 459, 182
Pac. 888 (1919).
9 "1 can not agree that the doctrines of this court are to be changed with every succeeding judge.
Nothing would inflict on me greater pain in quitting this place, than the recollection that I had done
anything to justify the reproach that the equity of this court varies like the Chancellor's foot." Gee v.
Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 414, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (Ch, 1818) (Lord Eldon, L.C.)
10 2 Colo. 141 (1873).
11 Id. at 169.
12 12 Colo. 108, 113, 116, 20 Pac. 4 (1888).
DICTA
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1959
In so designating the opinions, our Colorado Court has followed
the wording adopted by the United States Supreme Court, but that
Court seems carefully to restrict the designation to those opinions
which are majority opinions. As illustrations, in Northwest Air-
lines v. Minnesota,13 where four of the nine justices joined in dis-
sent and another concurred in the conclusion, it is reported that:
"Mr. Justice Frankfurter announced the conclusion and judgment
of the Court." A similar announcement was made in Hartzell v.
United States. 14 In Screws v. United States,15 it was reported that:
"Mr. Justice Douglas announced the judgment of the court and
delivered the following opinion in which the Chief Justice, Mr.
Justice Black, and Mr. Justice Reed concur."
Our Colorado constitution provides that the Supreme Court
may sit en banc or in two or more departments. No decisions of any
department shall become the judgment of the court unless con-
curred in by at least three judges. 10
A majority of the members constitute the court en banc and
a majority as thus constituted may decide a case, if at least three
judges concur.
17
No attempt is made here to furnish a complete list of the "Opin-
ions of the Court" which are plainly minority opinions, or those
which are without three concurring judges; nor to analyze the
opinions specially concurring as to the points of concurrence with
the "majority" opinion. We have checked through only a few
volumes of the reports for illustrations of the caution needed in
search for precedents in prior reported opinions. This check, through
Volumes 104 through 137 of the Colorado Reports, reveals at least
twenty cases in which the "Opinion of the Court" appears in whole
or part not to be a majority opinion.18
The case which seems best to point the moral and adorn the
tale is Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.19 The opinion by
Mr. Justice White was adopted with three judges dissenting just
prior to the end of Mr. Justice White's term. Rehearing was later
granted, and almost six months after Mr. Justice White left the
court, his opinion was again brought up for adoption. Three of the
members of the court dissented. Mr. Justice Teller wrote an opin-
ion arriving at the same conclusion as previously reached but by
13322 U.S. 292 (1944).
14 322 U.S. 680 (1944).
15 325 U.S. 91 (1944).
16 Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5.
17 Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. People ex rel. Wilson, 68 Colo. 487, 190 Pac. 513 (1920); Den-
ver & R.G.R.R. v. Burchord, 35 Colo. 539, 86 Pac. 749 (1906).
18 The following are the cases turned up by our limited search: Cox v. Metropolitan State Bank, Inc.,
336 P.2d 742 (Colo. 1959); Industrial Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. I11, 314 P.2d 698 (1957); Ace Flying
Service, Inc. v. Colorado Dept. of Agriculture, 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957); Tate v. People, 125
Col.. 527, 247 P.2d 665 (1952); Enos v. District Court, 124 Colo. 335, 238 P.2d 861 (1951); Chesney v.
People, 121 Colo. 73, 212 P.2d 1011 (1949); Cover v. Denver, 120 Colo. 451, 211 P.2d 830 (1949); Page
v. Lane, 120 Colo. 416, 211 P.2d 549 (1949); Ochsner v. Langendorf, 115 Colo. 453, 175 P.2d 392
(1946); Kidder v. People, 115 Colo. 72, 169 P.2d 181 (1946); McCutchen v. Jordan, 112 Colo. 499, 150
P.2d 859 (1944); Industrial Comm'n v. Parra, 111 Colo. 69, 137 P.2d 405 (1943); Aleman v. Annable,
110 Colo. 61, 129 P.2d 987 (1942); People ex rel. Lucke v. County Court, 109 Colo. 447, 126 P.2d 334
(1942); Denver v. Midwest Plumbing & Heating Co., 109 Colo. 395, 125 P.2d 960 (1942); Nebraska
Bridge Supply & Lumber Co. v. Deakin, 109 Colo. 367, 125 P.2d 962 (1942); Cox v. Godec, 107 Colo.
69, 108 P.2d 876 (1940); Snyder v. Schmoyer, 106 Colo. 290, 104 P.2d 612 (1940); Hall v. Hall, 105
Colo. 227, 97 P.2d 415 (1939); North River Ins. Co. v. Militello, 104 Colo. 28, 88 P.2d 567 (1939).
19 67 Colo. 225, 84 Pac. 604 (1919).
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a different line of argument. Mr. Justice Burke, by a separate opin-
ion, concurred in the conclusion reached in the "majority" opinion.
Mr. Justice Dennison by another separate opinion said that he con-
curred in "the conclusion of the majority of the court as announced
in the former opinion handed down in this case" and that "I am
authorized to state that Mr. Justice Allen concurs in this opinion."
This accounts for all seven judges of the court and not one of them
concurred entirely in the opinion of Mr. Justice White, the former
member. Yet the official report of the case states: "Mr. Justice
White delivered the opinion of the court."
As indicative of the extent to which the court itself may be-
come confused as a result of such indiscriminate labeling of opin-
ions, it is interesting to note that Kidder v. People20 was decided
with one judge not participating and three judges concurring in the
result "solely on the ground that defendant was not properly repre-
sented." The court being evenly divided as to other grounds stated
in the opinion, patently that was the only point decided. Yet, in
Warren v. People,-1 the court said: "One of the grounds for reversal
by this court of a judgment of conviction.., in the case of Kidder
v. People ... was that the one count upon which the jury returned
a verdict of guilty was insufficient." Again, in Cross v. People
22
the court said: "The statute here involved has been construed by
us in the following cases: . . . Kidder v. People. . . ." And again, in
Hardy v. People,2 3 the court said: "In our opinion in the Kidder
case ... we held that the question of the sufficiency of an informa-
tion to charge a crime could be raised in the supreme court for the
first time ... "
Enos v. District Court24 was decided with one judge dissenting
and three judges concurring only in the result. Yet, in Fiant v. Town
of Naturita,25 a quote from the minority opinion is cited as the
opinion of the court.
In Tate v. People26 a judgment of conviction was reversed. The
"Opinion of the Court" stated that one ground for the reversal was
20 115 Colo. 72, 169 P.2d 181 (1946).
21 121 Colo. 118, 121, 213 P.2d 381, 383 (1949).
22 122 Colo. 469, 471, 223 P.2d 202, 203 (1950).
23 133 Colo. 201, 206, 292 P.2d 973, 976 (1956).
24 124 Colo. 335, 238 P.2d 861 (1951).
25 127 Colo. 571, 574, 259 P.2d 278, 279 (1953).
26 125 Colo. 527, 247 P.2d 665 (1952).
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that prejudicial error had been committed by instructing on first
degree murder when not sustained by the evidence, even though
a verdict was returned of second degree. This holding specifically
overruled Ryan v. People.2 7 However, four judges joined in a me-
morandum opinion specifying the grounds on which in their opin-
ion the trial court committed error, which did not include the
ground of instruction on first degree murder. Yet, in Eckhardt v.
People,2 8 where a similar issue arose, the court, speaking through
the same judge who wrote the "Opinion of the Court" in the Tate
case, admitted that earlier cases had held to the contrary, but stated
that "this situation existing in this jurisdiction was clarified by the
latest pronouncement of this court on that question in the case of
Tate v. People . . ." and quoted from his opinion on that issue,
which had not been supported by the majority of the court, as
authority for overruling prior decisions of the court.
Even the case of Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel Co., 29
discussed above, has frequently been cited by the court and has
been quoted from as the voice of the court in Berman v. Denver"
and Bennett v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel Co.31
The opinions in Cox v. Metropolitan State Bank, Inc.,32 where
two judges dissented and two others filed specially concurring opin-
ions, illustrate the difficulty shared even by members of the courit
in determining on what points, if any, the concurring opinions con-
cur in the so-called "majority" opinion, other than in the result.
The designation, in its instructions for publication, of the opin-
ions and iparts of opinions which are the expression of the opinion
of the court, would put a further burden on an already over-
burdened court, but we think it would assist both the bar and the
courts in their necessary research and perhaps make a challenge
for clarity of expression in concurring opinions.
2750 Colo. 99, 114 Pac. 306 (1911).
28 126 Colo. 18, 22, 247 P.2d 673, 675 (1952).
29 67 Colo. 225, 84 Pac. 604 (1919).
30 120 Colo. 218, 230, 209 P.2d 754, 760 (1949).
31 121 Colo. 325, 333, 215 P.2d 714, 717 (1950).
32 336 P.2d 742 (Colo. 1959).
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